University of Nebraska - Lincoln

DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln
Publications of the University of Nebraska
Public Policy Center

Public Policy Center, University of Nebraska

2005

R (ON THE APPLICATIONOFAL SKEINI) V. SECRETARY OF
DEFENCE: A LOOK AT THE UNITED KINGDOM'S
EXTRATERRITORIAL OBLIGATIONS IN IRAQ AND BEYOND
Tarik Abdel-Monem
University of Nebraska - Lincoln, tabdelmonem2@unl.edu

Patrick J.D. Kennedy
University of Arkansas

Ekaterina Apostolova
University of Nebraska-Lincoln

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/publicpolicypublications
Part of the Public Policy Commons

Abdel-Monem, Tarik; Kennedy, Patrick J.D.; and Apostolova, Ekaterina, "R (ON THE APPLICATIONOFAL
SKEINI) V. SECRETARY OF DEFENCE: A LOOK AT THE UNITED KINGDOM'S EXTRATERRITORIAL
OBLIGATIONS IN IRAQ AND BEYOND" (2005). Publications of the University of Nebraska Public Policy
Center. 45.
https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/publicpolicypublications/45

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Public Policy Center, University of Nebraska at
DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln. It has been accepted for inclusion in Publications of the University
of Nebraska Public Policy Center by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska Lincoln.

Abdel-Monem, Kennedy & Apostolova in Florida Journal of International Law (2005) 17.
Copyright 2005, University of Florida. Used by permission.

R (ON THE APPLICATION OF AL SKEINI) V. SECRETARY OF
DEFENCE: A LOOK AT THE UNITED KINGDOM'S
EXTRATERRITORIAL OBLIGATIONS IN IRAQ AND BEYOND
Tarik Abdel-Monem, • Patrick J.D. Kennedy, ••
& Ekaterina Apostolova•••

I.

OVERVIEW

345

n.

BACKGROUND

347
349
350
351
352

A. Loizidou v. Turkey
B. Bankovic v. Belgium
C. Il~cu v. Moldova
D. Issa v. Turkey

m.

R (ON THE ApPLICATION OF AL SKEINI) V. SECRETARY OF
STATE FOR DEFENCE . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

354

IV.

IMPLICATIONS

357

V.

FuTURE DEVELOPMENTS

359

VI.

CONCLUSION

364
I. OVERVIEW

On the evening of September 13, 2003, British soldiers from the
Queen's Lancashire Regiment arrested several Iraqi men at a hotel in
Basra.! The soldiers took the hotel receptionist - Baha Mousa - and
several other men to a holding facility previously used by the Iraqi

• JD/MPH (University onowa), Research Specialist, University ofNebraska Public Policy
Center.
•• Project Coordinator, University of Arkansas, Clinton School of Public Service.
••• Research Assistant, University of Nebraska-Lincoln.
I. See R (on the Application of AI Skeini) v. Sec'y of State for Defence (Skeini v. Sec'y of
State for Defence), 2004 Q.B. Div'l Ct. ~ 81-83, available at http://www.bailii.orglew/
cases/EWHC/Admin/2004/ (describing a search and arrest ofIraqis at Ibn AI Haitham Hotel by
forces of the United Kingdom on the evening of September 13/14, 2003).
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Intelligence Service. 2 Coalition personnel reportedly hooded the men,
forced them into stress positions and severely beat them in the abdomen
and genitals. 3 Mousa was allegedly taken to another room where the
soldiers further beat him. He later died. 4 The death certificate issued after
the incident indicated that Mousa had died of "cardio-respiratory arrest
asphyxia."s His family was later offered $3,000 in compensation. 6
Attorneys took Mousa's case - and five other claims by Iraqi
plaintiffs about alleged killings by British forces 7 - before the High Court
of England and Wales, asserting that the British government violated
human rights protections guaranteed by the European Convention on
Human Rights through the U.K. Human Rights Act of 1998. 8 The crucial
question before the High Court was whether or not the United Kingdom
was obligated to uphold European Convention rights and protections
during its military occupation of Iraq. 9 On December 14,2004, the High
Court ruled in R (on the application ofAl Skeini) v Secretary ofState for
Defence that U.K. jurisdiction extended to Iraq in the case of Mousa's
death, and by virtue of its Convention obligations to prohibit torture and
protect human life of persons within its jurisdiction, that the United
Kingdom had violated the European Convention even though the death
took place in Iraq. The Al Skeini case is a major ruling because it provides
guidance on when the United Kingdom is obligated to uphold the
2. See International Committee ofthe Red Cross, Report ofthe International Committee of
the Red Cross (ICRC) on the Treatment by the Coalition Forces of Prisoners of War and Other
Protected Persons by the Geneva Conventions in Iraq During Arrest, Internment and Interrogation
(Feb. 2004), ~ 16 [hereinafter ICRC Report] (describing eventS at the A1-Harnamiyah facility on
the evening of September 13,2003).
3. See Skeini, 2004 Q.B. Div'l Ct. ~ 85 (describing statement of Kifah AI-Mutari about
mistreatment ofprisoners by coalition forces at the prison).
4. Id. ~ 86.
5. ICRC Report, supra note 2, ~ 16.
6. See "They Were Kicking Us, Laughing. It Was a Great Pleasure for Them," THE
GUARDIAN, Feb. 21,2004 (noting compensation paid for Mousa's death), available at http://www.
guardian.co.uk/military/story/0,11816,1153013,00.html (last visited June 22, 2005).
7. See Skeini, 2004 Q.B. Div'l Ct. ~~ 56-80 (reviewing the alleged factual versions leading
up to the deaths of five other Iraqis in Basra during military operations).
8. See Gavin Cordon & Emily Pennink, Iraqi Families Launch Legal Battle Over Civilian
Deaths, INDEPENDENT (London), May 5, 2004 (discussing claims by Iraqi families for deaths caused
by British military personnel), available at http://news.independent.co.uk/uk/legal/story.
jsp?story=518260 (last visited June 22, 2005).
9. See Richard Norton-Taylor, Families Win Hearing on Deaths, GUARDIAN (London), May
12, 2004 (discussing the High Court's ruling to admit the case against the United Kingdom because
its European Convention obligations may extend to Iraq), available at http://www.guardian.co.uk
/international/story/0,3604,1214674,00.html (last visited June 22, 2005).
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European Convention on Human Rights in areas both outside its own
borders and outside Europe itself.
II. BACKGROUND

The European Convention on Human Rights10 is arguably the strongest
regional human rights treaty in force today. The Convention echoes the
Universal Declaration ofHuman Rights. It protects the fundamental rights
to life, II liberty,12 free expression,13 and prohibits torture and other forms
of mistreatment,14 among other obligations. All members of the Council
of Europe - now composed of forty-six nations lS - must accept the
Convention as a condition of membership.16 The judicial body of the
Convention is the European Court ofHuman Rights,17 based in Strasbourg,
France, and its enforcement body - the Committee of Ministers - is
composed ofthe Foreign Ministers ofCouncil ofEurope member-states. 18
The United Kingdom is bound to uphold the rights and protections of
the Convention as one of the founding member-states of the Council of
Europe. 19 It was first party to a case before the Court as a defendant in
1975,20 and has since been a defendant in other high profile cases
10. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Apr. II,
1950, pmbl., Europ. T.S. No.5 [hereinafter European Convention for Human Rights], available at
http://www.echr.coe.int/Convention/webConvenENG.pdf(last visited June 22, 2005).
II. [d. art. 2.
12. [d. art. 5.
13. [d. art. 10.
14. [d. art. 3.
15. See COUNCIL OF EUROPE, THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE'S MEMBER STATES, at
http://www.coe.int/TlE/Com/About_Coe/Member_states/default.asp (last visited June 22, 2005)
(listing 46 member-nations of the Council of Europe from Albania to the United Kingdom).
16. See European Convention for Human Rights, supra note 10, art. I (stating that all parties
of the Council of Europe must uphold the rights and obligations of the Convention).
17. See id. art. 32 (I) ("The jurisdiction of the Court shall extend to all matters concerning
the interpretation and application ofthe Convention and the protocols thereto...."); see also D.J.
HARRIs ET AL., LAW OFTHE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RiGHTS 648-90 (1995) (describing
the functions, composition, and procedure of the Court).
18. See Statute ofthe Council ofEurope, May 5, 1949, art. 15(a), Europ. T.S. No. I ("[T]he
Committee of Ministers shall consider the action required to further the aim of the Council of
Europe, including the conclusion of conventions or agreements.").
19. See COUNCIL OF EUROPE, supra note 15 (noting that the United Kingdom was one ofthe
ten founding nations of the Council of Europe).
20. See DONALD W. JACKSON, THE UNITED KINGDOM CONFRONTS THE EUROPEAN
CONVENTION ON HUMAN RiGHTS 126 (1997) ("The first decision ofthe European Court ofHuman
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involving operations against Irish Republican Army operatives, such as
Ireland v. United Kingdom 21 and McCann v. United Kingdom. 22 As the
United Kingdom is ultimately accountable to the European Court for
human rights cases, its own courts commonly cite to case law ofthe Court
in Strasbourg in domestic decisions. 23 In 1998, the United Kingdom
adopted virtually all of the Convention into its domestic law through the
Human Rights Act of 1998, making the Convention's rights enforceable
in the U.K. justice system and placing great authority in the precedent of
the European Court in Strasbourg. 24
In recent years, the Strasbourg Court has issued a small yet important
number of cases determining when the Convention's protections apply
outside a member-state's national territory. This case law revolves around
Article 1 of the Convention, which states that "[t]he High Contracting
Parties shall secure to everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and
freedoms defined in ... this Convention.,,25 Collectively, the Court's
decisions in this area indicate that a member-state can extend its
jurisdiction abroad if particular factual situations are found to exist, thus
obliging it to uphold the Convention's rights in such situations.

Rights that involved the United Kingdom as a state defendant was the Golder case, decided in
1975.").
21. Ireland v. United Kingdom, App. No. 5310/71, 2. E.H.H.R. 25 (1978).
22. McCann v. United Kingdom, App. No. 18984/91,324 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1995).
23. See JACKSON, supra note 20, at 126-27 (outlining instances in which U.K. courts have
cited to the European Court of Human Rights).
24. See Human Rights Act 1998, introduction ("An Act to give further effect to rights and
freedoms guaranteed under the European Convention on Human Rights"); see also DEPARTMENT
OF CONSTITUTIONAL AFFAIRS, PEOPLE'S RIGHTs> HUMAN RIGHTs> FREQUENTLY ASKED
QUESTIONS, available at http://www.dca.gov.uk/hract/hrafaqs.htm (last visited June 22, 2005).
The Convention enshrines fundamental civil and political rights, but for many
years it was not part of our own law. Using the Convention usually meant taking
a case to the European Court ofHuman Rights in Strasbourg. This was often timeconsuming and expensive.
Since coming into force on 2 October 2000, the Human Rights Act has made
rights from the ECHR (the Convention rights) enforceable in our own courts.
DEPARTMENT OF CONSTITUTIONAL AFFAIRS, supra.
25. European Convention for Human Rights, supra note 10, art. 1.
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A. Loizidou v. Turkey
The first major European Court decision addressing extraterritorial
jurisdiction was its 1995 ruling in Loizidou v. Turkey.26 Loizidou was a
Greek Cypriot who sued Turkey for Convention deprivations arising out
of Turkish military occupation over parts of Cyprus. 27 Both Turkey and
Cyprus were member-states to the Convention, but Turkey argued that it
had no jurisdiction - and hence no Convention obligations - in occupied
Cyprus because that territory was part of the self-declared, breakaway
"Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus" that was not party to the
Convention. 28
In its ruling, the Court held that Turkey did have jurisdiction in
Northern Cyprus by virtue of its military occupation:
[T]he concept of "jurisdiction" under Article 1 of the Convention
(art. 1) is not restricted to the national territory of the Contracting
States. Accordingly, the responsibility ofContracting States can be
involved by acts and omissions of their authorities which produce
effects outside their own territory . . . the responsibility of a
Contacting Party could also arise when as a consequence ofmilitary
action - whether lawful or unlawful- it exercises effective control
of an area outside its national territory. The obligation to secure, in
such an area, the rights and freedoms set out in the Convention,
derives from the fact of such control whether it be exercised
directly, through its armed forces, or through a subordinate local
administration. 29
Because Turkey had approximately 30,000 soldiers stationed in Northern
Cyprus in support of the Turkish separatist area,30 it was obvious to the
Court that Turkey had effective overall control ofthat portion ofCyprus. 31
Because of its effective control, Turkey had expanded its jurisdiction to

26. Loizidou v. Turkey, App. No. 15318/89.
27. See id." 10-14 (describing the plaintiff's claims for deprivation of property rights and
events leading up to her arrest and detention by Turkish forces).
28. See id." 35,51 (describing Turkey's argument that the claims could not be imputable
to Turkey as it had no jurisdiction in the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus).
29. [d.' 52.
30. See id. , 16 (describing the presence ofTurkish military personnel in Northern Cyprus).
31. See Loizidou, App. No. 15318/89,' 56 (concluding that Turkey had overall control of
Northern Cyprus through its occupation).
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that area of Cyprus it occupied, along with its Article 1 obligation to
uphold Convention rights in that area. 32
B. Bankovic v. Belgium
The Court's 2001 decision in Bankoviev. Belgium33 revisited the issue
of Article 1 jurisdiction abroad. The Bankovie plaintiffs were family
members of civilians killed by North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO) air strikes on Belgrade during the 1999 Kosovo crisis. The
plaintiffs sued NATO nations that were also party to the European
Convention on Human Rights for violations of Article 2 - the right to
life. 34 At the time ofthe military operation, Yugoslavia was not a member
of the Council of Europe and the Convention therefore did not cover that
nation.
Citing to Loizidou, the plaintiffs conceded that NATO did not have
overall effective control ofBelgrade or the obligation to uphold the entire
Convention there. However, they argued that the amount of control
actually exercised should impose an obligation by member-states to
uphold the specific Convention rights implicated by such control. 35
Through its intentional, precision air strikes on civilian targets, the
plaintiffs asserted that NATO had exercised a form of control, and was
therefore obligated to protect the particular Convention right implicated by
such activity - i.e. the Article 2 right to life.36 In their defense, the NATO
governments argued that "jurisdiction" should be construed according to
its customary definition in international law as a nation's capacity to
exercise legal authority over a person - such as an arrest or detention. 37
If the plaintiffs' proposal was upheld, NATO asserted that such an
understanding of extraterritorial jurisdiction would substantially
undermine the international structure and policy by granting the European

32. See id. ~ 56 ("Her [Turkey's] obligation to secure to the applicant the rights and freedoms
set out in the Convention therefore extends to the northern part of Cyprus.").
33. Bankovic v. Belgium, App. No. 52207/99, 200I-XII Eur. Ct. H.R. (2001).
34. See id. ~~ 1, 11, 28 (describing the plaintiffs and their claims against NATO nations for
a missile strike against a television station resulting in sixteen deaths).
35. See id. ~ 46 (describing the plaintiffs' argument that the Loizidou effective control
principle could be applied on a basis relative to amount of control actually exercised).
36. See id. ~ 47 (describing the plaintiffs' argument that NATO was not obligated to uphold
all of the Convention, but those specifically applicable to the factual context).
37. See id. ~ 36 (describing the respondents' argument that jurisdiction be defined "in
accordance with the ordinary and well-established meaning of that term" as an exercise oflegal
authority).
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Court the ability to review military operations conducted by member-states
anywhere in the world. 38
Examining the meaning of Article I, the Court concluded that
jurisdiction meant territorial jurisdiction, and only in exceptional casessuch as in Loizidou - could jurisdiction extend abroad. 39 In Loizidou,
Turkey'sjurisdiction in Northern Cyprus existed vis-a-vis the obvious fact
of its military occupation and the overall control of that area. 40 On the
other hand, if it accepted the plaintiffs' theory of extraterritorial
jurisdiction in Bankovi C, the Court believed that the commission ofany act
by a member-state anywhere in the world that resulted in a detrimental
effect would undermine the Convention's regional purpose. 41 It
specifically observed that the Convention was a treaty operating "in an
essentially regional context and notably in the legal space (espace
juridique) ofthe Contracting States. The [Federal Republic ofYugoslavia]
clearly does not fall within this legal space. The Convention was not
designed to be applied throughout the world.'>42 The Court therefore sided
with the NATO parties and removed the case for lack ofjurisdiction.
C.

Il~cu

v. Moldova

In July of 2004, the Court addressed whether or not Russia had
Convention obligations in the self-proclaimed Moldovan Republic of
Transdniestria (MRT) in Ila:;cu v. Moldova. 43 Following the dissolution of
the Soviet Union, the former Moldavian Socialist Soviet Republic
devolved into an independent Moldova composed of ethnic Romanians,
and the rival MRT in the eastern portion of the state with allegiance to
Russia. 44 A division ofthe Soviet Red Army remained in Moldova as the

38. See Bankovic, App. No. 52207/99, , 43 (describing respondents' arguments about the
"serious international consequences" that would exist if the plaintiffs' proposal was upheld).
39. See id. " 59-71 (outlining the Court's analysis of Article I jurisdiction).
40. See id. , 70 (reviewing and upholding the Loizidou judgment).
41. See id., 75 (responding to the plaintiffs' proposed theory). The Court also noted that in
Loizidou, Northern Cyprus had previously been covered by the Convention prior to Turkish
intervention.
42. Id.' 80.
43. Il~cu v. Moldova, App. No. 48787/99 Gudgment) (July 2004).
44. See id. ~ 28-41 (outlining events following the dissolution of the USSR).
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Russian Operational Group (ROG) and fought along with and provided
anns and material aid to the separatist pro-Russian forces. 45
Il~cu and three other Moldovan plaintiffs claimed that a number of
Convention violations by the Transdniestrian separatists had been
committed in the MRT that were imputable to Russia vis-a-vis its Article
1 obligations. They argued that Russia had jurisdiction in the MRT by
virtue of its political, military and economic support of the breakaway
enclave, amounting to a Loizidou-like effective contro1. 46 Russia argued
that the ROG presence of2,000 soldiers was not comparable to that ofthe
Turkish occupation in Cyprus involving 30,000 personnel, and that the
ROG was not an occupying force but on a "peacekeeping mission.'>47
However, the Court sided with the plaintiffs, indicating that the support
given by Russia to the MRT was enough to engage its Article 1
responsibility for Convention violations committed by the separatists. 48
D. Issa v. Turkey

In its other 2004 decision involving extraterritorial jurisdiction - Issa
v. Turkey49 - the Court examined Turkey's jurisdiction for alleged
killings of Kurds in Northern Iraq. The plaintiffs were family members of
Kurds living close to the Turkish border, who claimed that seven male
relatives had been physically detained by Turkish forces in Iraq in April
1995. 50 The men were later found dead after they had been allegedly

45. See id. ~~ 70-79 (discussing how members of the Soviet Fourteenth Army remained in
Moldova to fight with separatist forces of the MRT); see a/so id. ~ 380 (noting the Court's
observation that Russian troops fought with and armed the MRT against Moldova).
46. See id. ~~ 365-70 (describing the plaintiff's arguments and reliance on the Loizidou
holding).
47. See id. ~ 355 (describing Russia's arguments).
48. See I/a~u, App. No. 48787/99, ~ 382 (judgment) (holding that Russia had Article 1
responsibility in the MRT). The circumstances in the I/a~u case are factually analogous to ongoing
Russian support ofthe self-declared Republic ofSouth Ossetia in Northern Georgia. South Ossetia
declared itself independent from Georgia in 1992, with the intention ofjoining North Ossetia as
part ofthe Republic ofRussia. Since the outbreak ofcivil war between Georgian soldiers and South
Ossetian separatists, the Russian military has allegedly been providing military support to South
Ossetian separatists, and been involved in random detentions, mistreatment, and killings of
Georgian civilians. See International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights, Human Rights in the
OSCE Region: the Balkans, the Caucasus, Europe, Central Asia, and North America Report 2002
(Events of 2001), avai/ab/e at http://www.ihf-hr.orgldocuments/doc_summary.php?sec_id=3&d_id
=1782 (last visited June 22,2005).
49. Issa v. Turkey, App. No. 31821/96 (judgment) (Nov. 2004).
50. See id. ~~ 12-17 (describing the plaintiffs and their version of the facts).
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detained, with their ears, tongues and genitals mutilated. 51 Turkey denied
the charges, but did admit that it had conducted a large-scale military
operation in Iraq at the time ofthe alleged killings, although that operation
was ten kilometers north of where the alleged events occurred.52
At the outset, the Court recognized that a nation may have
extraterritorial jurisdiction vis-a-vis either effective control of an area,
such as in Loizidou, or through the specific actions of its agents acting
abroad. 53 To support this latter proposal, the Court cited several nonEuropean Court cases for the general proposition that "[a]ccountability in
such situations stems from the fact that Article I ofthe Convention cannot
be interpreted so as to allow a State Party to perpetrate violations of the
Convention on the territory of another State, which it could not perpetrate
on its own territory."54
In its decision, the Court recognized that Turkey had conducted a large
military operation in Iraq at the time ofthe alleged killings in an area close
to where they occurred.55 Due to this presence, Turkey had temporary
Loizidou-like effective control ofthat portion ofIraq, and therefore ifthere
was "a sufficient factual basis for holding that, at the relative time, the
victims were within that specific area, it would follow logically that they
were within the jurisdiction ofTurkey.,,56 However, this factual basis could
not be proven beyond a reasonable doubt because of a lack of detailed
testimony and independent eyewitness confirmation placing the Kurds
within the Turkish area of operations. 57 The Court thus ruled in favor of
Turkey because it could not be proven that they had any Convention
obligations to uphold in regards to the Iraqi Kurds' claims.

mr

51. See id.
18-24 (describing the search for and discovery of the missing men's bodies
after they had been allegedly arrested by Turkish forces).
52. See id. ~ 25 (outlining Turkey's argument).
53. See id. ~~ 69-71 (noting that a state may be held accountable for its actions abroad if it
exercises effective control of an area, or through its agents' exercise of control).
54. See Issa, App. No. 31821/96 (citing Lopez Burgos v. Uruguay, Communication No.
52/1979 (July 29, 1981), U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/OP/l at 99 (1984); Celiberti de Casariego v. Uruguay,
Communication No. 56/1979 (July 29, 1981), U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/OP/l at 92 (1985); Coard v.
United States, Case 10.951, Report No. 109/99, Inter-Am. C.H.R. (Sept. 29, 1999)).
55. See id.
63, 73 (stating that it is "undisputed" that Turkey had conducted a large
military operation in Iraq from March 19 to April 16, 1995).
56. Id ~74.
57. See id. 76-81 (holding that it could not be proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the
Kurds had been killed in an area controlled by Turkish forces).

mr

mr
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III. R (ON THE ApPLICATION OF AL SKEINI) V. SECRETARY OF
STATE FOR DEFENCE

The critical question before the High Court ofEngland and Wales was
whether or not the United Kingdom had Article 1jurisdiction in Iraq at the
time that Mousa and the five other Iraqis were allegedly killed by British
military personnel. To resolve this question, the High Court reviewed all
the Strasbourg precedent on extraterritorial jurisdiction and outlined a
number of conclusions that led to its final holding.
First, in a nod to the Bankovi6decision, the High Court recognized that
a nation's Article 1 jurisdiction should primarily be considered to extend
only to its own borders. 58 However, exceptions did exist where a party to
the Convention could have extraterritorial jurisdiction in another nation,
such as that recognized in Loizidou where Turkey had effective control of
Northern Cyprus through its military occupation. S9 Yet the High Court
noted that in the Strasbourg case law, with the exception of Issa, membernations to the Convention were only found to have jurisdiction abroad visa-vis effective control in nations that were also party to the Convention.
For instance, in Loizidou, both Turkey and Cyprus were parties to the
European Convention. Likewise, in Ilascu, Russia had jurisdiction in the
Moldovan Republic of Transdniestria, a self-declared region of Moldova
- also a member of the Convention. 60 The European Court's finding of
jurisdiction in those cases was therefore consistent with its dicta in the
Bankovi6 decision that the Convention was only meant to be applied
within the space of its regional treaty members. 61

58. See Skeini v. Sec'y ofState for Defence, 2004 Q.B. Div'l Ct. ~ 245 ("[T]he essential and
primary nature of article 1 jurisdiction and therefore ofthe Convention is territorial.").
59. See id. ~ 248 ("[I]t is clear that there is an exception to the principle ofterritoriality where
a state party has effective control of an area, lawful or unlawful.").
60. See id. ~ 249 (noting how the effective control doctrine has only been applied in instances
in which one Convention party was in effective control of the territory of another Convention
party). The Loizidou and Ilascu cases were factually analogous, as both the "Turkish Republic of
Northern Cyprus" and the "Moldovan Republic ofTransdniestria" were separatist areas ofnations
party to the Convention. In Ilascu, the Court ofHuman Rights found extraterritorial jurisdiction to
exist only at a point after both nations had ratified the Convention. The Convention had come into
force on September 12, 1997, in Moldova and May 5, 1998, in Russia. Although the civil war and
Russian intervention in Moldova preceded that date, the Court found Russia to have official
jurisdiction over the MRT after May 5, 1998. See Il~cu v. Belgium, App. No. 48787/99 (judgment)
(July 2004), ~ 379-94.
61. See Bankovic v. Belgium, App. No. 52207/99, ~ 80 (discussing how the Convention's
protections were not meant to be applied ''throughout the world" but only within the legal space
of the contracting European parties to the Convention).
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The High Court of England and Wales was thus faced with reconciling
this pattern of cases with the Issa decision, a case in which the European
Court recognized that effective control extended Turkey's extraterritorial
jurisdiction to portions of Iraq - obviously not a European nation party to
the Convention. Indeed, the High Court noted that Issa was inconsistent
with Bankovic, and that "[i]t may well be that there is more than one
school of thought at Strasbourg.,,62 However, given that the weight of the
Strasbourg case law involved extraterritorial jurisdiction ofnations within
the legal space of Council of Europe members, the High Court found
Bankovic to be the controlling precedent, and that a member-nation's
extraterritorial jurisdiction under Article 1 should be construed as narrowly
as possible. 63
The High Court specifically came to this conclusion because the
Bankovicdecision first allowed for extraterritorialjurisdiction vis-a-vis the
effective control doctrine by upholding Loizidou;64 second, however this
ruling made clear that the Convention was only to be applied within the
regional space of the Convention parties - the Council of Europe. 65
Therefore, a member-state to the Convention could only have
extraterritorial jurisdiction if it had effective control of the territory of
another Council of Europe member - such as in Cyprus and Moldovaand not in Iraq.66
The only remaining possibility in which the United Kingdom could
have jurisdiction outside its territory - in this case Iraq - would be
within the limited exceptions to extraterritorial jurisdiction where nations
retain jurisdiction over their embassies, aircrafts, and ships abroad. 67 In all

62. Skeini, 2004 Q.B. Div'l Ct. '11265.
63. See id. '11'11268-69 (stating that Bankovicwas the watershed authority in questions of
extraterritorial jurisdiction and that there is no broad application of extraterritorial application of
the Convention's jurisdiction but only limited exceptions).
64. See Bankovic, App. No. 52207/99, '11 70 (reviewing and upholding the Loizidou
judgment).
65. Id. '1180.
66. See Skeini, 2004 Q.B. Div'l Ct. '11281.
It follows in our judgment that, since Iraq is not within the regional sphere ofthe
Convention, the complaints before us do not fall within the article] jurisdiction
of the United Kingdom under the heading of the extra-territorial doctrine of the
"effective control of an area" exception as found in the cases of northern Cyprus
and Moldova.

Id.

67. See id. '11284 (considering limited exceptions to extraterritorial jurisdiction).
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of the six claims brought against the United Kingdom by Iraqis, except
Mousa's case, the deaths resulted from military operations conducted by
British soldiers in combat areas, and in almost all the cases there were
conflicting versions of the facts. 68 For instance, one of the deceased was
killed while visiting a house stormed by British soldiers, and the
claimants' disputed whether the deceased posed an armed threat or not. 69
In another case, the deceased was killed while driving a van stopped by
British soldiers. The United Kingdom argued that the man had acted
aggressively and grabbed the soldier's weapon, whereas the plaintiff
argued that the deceased had simply been driving down the street when his
van came under fire and he was shot and killed. 70 The High Court
distinguished those five cases from the sixth claim alleging the
extrajudicial killing of Baha Mousa:
The sixth case of Mr Baha Mousa, however, as it seems to us, is
different. He was not just a victim, under however unfortunate
circumstances, ofmilitary operations. He was not, as we understand
the matter, a prisoner of war. He was, prima facie at any rate, a
civilian employee . . . He was taken into custody in a British
military base. There he met his death, it is alleged by beatings at the
hands of his prison guards ...
In the circumstances the burden lies on the British military prison

authorities to explain how he came to lose his life while in British
custody. It seems to us that it is not at all straining the examples of
extra-territorial jurisdiction discussed in the jurisprudence
considered above to hold that a British military prison, operating in
Iraq with the consent of the Iraqi sovereign authorities, and
containing arrested suspects, falls within even a narrowly limited
exception exemplified by embassies, consulates, vessels and
aircraft.
The High Court of England and Wales thus held that, of the six cases of
deceased Iraqis, Baha Mousa's fell within the United Kingdom's
jurisdiction, and therefore, under the European Convention on Human

68. See id. ~~ 56-80 (describing conflicting versions ofevents in which Iraqis were killed in
Basra during military operations).
69. See id. ~'IJ 60-63 (describing versions leading to the death ofMuharnmad Abdul Ridha
Salim).
70. See id. ~ 68-76 (describing conflicting accounts ofthe death ofWaleed Sayay Muzban).
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Rights. Article 2 of the Convention - the right to life - and Article 3 the prohibition oftorture - imposed an obligation upon a member-nation
to properly investigate alleged torture and extrajudicial deaths of
individuals in government custody.71 Although the Royal Military Police's
Special Investigation Branch had conducted a cursory investigation of
Mousa's death, the High Court found it inadequate,72 and therefore held
that the United Kingdom had violated Article 2 and Article 3 of the
European Convention on Human RightS. 73
IV. IMPLICATIONS

By allowing only for the existence of extraterritorial jurisdiction
outside ofCouncil of Europe nations in very narrow exceptions, the High
Court ofEngland and Wales has strictly limited potential liability for U.K.
forces in Iraq. In controlled situations involving Convention violations
following traditional police-style arrests and detentions in custody,
potential liability does exist. However, the Convention's reach does not
appear to cover areas outside of Europe where the United Kingdom is
either engaged in military operations, or in effective control of a territory,
e.g., military occupation, on the grounds that the Convention was not
broadly intended to be enforced throughout the world, as stated in
Bankovic.
However, the High Court's holding rests on a questionable analysis of
the Strasbourg case law. As noted in its decision, the 2001 Bankovic
judgment and the European Court's analysis in its 2004 decision in Issa
are not compatible and do seem to indicate that there are conflicting
approaches towards extraterritorial jurisdiction outside of Europe among
Strasbourg judges. 74 By identifying Bankovic as the controlling precedent
on extraterritorial jurisdiction, the High Court furthers the United
Kingdom's national interests in limiting its potential liability for violations
of the Convention in non-European nations to a limited set ofexceptions,
such as Mousa's death in government custody. By neglecting the more

71. See Skeini, 2004 Q.B. Div'! Ct. mJ 322-23 (discussing the burden on the government
respondent to account for the death of those in its custody).
72. See id. mJ 326-31 (outlining the investigation ofMousa's death and finding that it was
inadequate).
73. [d.' 344.
74. See id. , 265 ("It may well be that there is more than one schoo! of thought at
Strasbourg.").
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recent decision of Issa, the High Court has side stepped the possibility that
it marks anew, broader expansion ofthe European Convention's coverage
outside the boundaries of Europe. In Issa, the Strasbourg Court held that
a European nation could indeed have jurisdiction outside of Europe
entirely. Its decision was based on the notion that a nation should not be
legally permitted to commit a human rights violation abroad that it could
not commit within its own territory - a fundamental principle of
international human rights. Such a reading is arguably an indication that
the European Court is more willing to extend the Convention beyond the
borders of Europe than the High Court of England and Wales would like
to believe.
Legal implications notwithstanding, the Al Skeini ruling has already
created a significant amount of controversy in the United Kingdom. Two
High Court officials stated that the Ministry of Defence should hold an
independent inquiry and criticized the initial investigation as not "timely,
open or effective," "dilatory" and "lacking accountability.,,75 The Royal
Military Police have been scrutinized by Amnesty International repeatedly
for its failure to conduct adequate investigations following the deaths of
Iraqi civilians. 76 U.K. military law grants the Army Prosecuting Authority
within the Armed Forces exclusive rights to block criminal charges against
soldiers in a time of war. One possible long-term implication of recent
criticisms could be that British Armed Forces lose this right to block
charges, allowing for more thorough investigations ofall future allegations

75. See Severin Carrell, Revealed: The Handwritten Notes Made by Soldiers After Mousa
Died, INDEPENDENT (London), Dec. 19,2004 ("We are unable to accept that the investigation has
been open or effective. Other than at the early stages and at the autopsy, the family has not been
involved. The outcome of the sm report is not known. There are no conclusions. There has been
no public accountability. All this in a case where the burden of explanation lies heavily on the
United Kingdom authorities.").
76. See Amnesty International, Iraq: Killings of Civilians in Basra and al-'Amara, ~ 67
("RMP investigations are shrouded in secrecy and lack the level of public scrutiny required by
international standards."), available at http://web.amnesty.org/ library/index/engmdel400n004
(last visited June 22, 2005).
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of prisoner or civilian abuse against British soldiers. 77 This degree of
criticism is expected, given that overall public support for the United
Kingdom's involvement in Iraq is generally perceived to be low, a possible
consequence of the recently made allegations ofprisoner abuse by British
military personnel. 78

V. FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS
The relevance of Strasbourg precedent on extraterritorial jurisdiction
has become more significant given recent occurrences in the United
Kingdom. On July 7,2005, bombs exploded inside three central London
subway stations. 79 An hour later, another bomb detonated on a doubledecker bus. 80 Fifty-six people were killed in the explosions, and hundreds
were injured. 81 Shortly after the terrorist attacks, a message was placed on
an Egyptian web site of"the secret Jihad Group for AI-Qa'idah in Europe"
disclosing to have planned the four explosions. 82 The reason given by the

77. See Joshua Rozenberg, Army May Lose Right to Stop Charges, TELEGRAPH (London),
Dec. 6, 2004 (''The Armed Forces may lose the right to block criminal charges against troops
following the case of a soldier accused of shooting dead an Iraqi civilian during an operation"),
available at http://www.sport.telegraph.co.uklnews/main.jhtml?xml=/news/2004/06/ ll/narmy11.
xmI&sSheet=/portaU2004/06/Il/ixportal.html; John Silvennan, Army to Feel Impact 0/ Mousa
Judgment, BBCNEWS (World Edition), Dec. 14,2004 ("The longer-tenn consequence could be that
the armed forces lose the right to block criminal charges against troops. This is an issue which
concerns the Attorney-General and which has been put on hold while the courts consider the cases
ofMr Mousa and others."), available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/ 4096I8I.stm.
78. See Alan Travis, Support/or War Plummets, GUARDIAN, Jan. 25, 2005 ("Support for the
war in Iraq has slumped in the aftermath ofthe photographs ofBritish soldiers abusing prisoners,
according to the results ofthis month's Guardian/lCM poll."), available at http://politics.guardian.
co.uklpolls/story/0,I1030,1397928,00.html (last visited June 22, 2005).
79. See Four Suicide Bombers Struck in Central London on Thursday 7 July, Killing 52
People and Injuring 700, BBC NEWS (U.K.), July 7,2005 (giving an overview of the London
terrorist attacks), available at http://news.bbc.co.ukll/shared/spUhi/uk/05/london_blasts/what_
happened/html/default.stm.

80. Id.
81. See Emily Pennink & Anna Farley, War on terror. Seven more July 21 arrests,
BIRMINGHAM POST, Aug. 1, 2005 (discussing the massive investigation undertaken after the July
21 terrorist attacks in London), available at LEXIS, World News, Europe, News, European News
Sources File.
82. See Chinese scholars say London attacks to strengthen anti-terror cooperation, BBC
MONITORINGlBBC MONITORING INTERNATIONAL REPORTS, July 22, 2005, (quoting Chinese
publication on the causes and effects ofthe London terrorist attacks), available at LEXIS, World
News, Europe, News, European News Sources File.
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group for the bombings was "Britain's massacre ill Iraq and
Afghanistan."83
Intensive counter-terrorist measures followed the terrorist attacks.
British secretary Charles Clarke published a list of criteria under which
"Britain Islamic radicals" could be deported from the United Kingdom or
denied permission to enter it. 84 The list includes behavior that "express
views which foment, justify or glorify terrorist violence in furtherance of
particular beliefs; seek to provoke others to terrorist acts; foment other
serious criminal activity or seek to provoke others to serious criminal acts;
or foster hatred which might lead to inter-community violence in the
U.K."85 It covers any non-citizen currently residing in the United
Kingdom. 86 This plan has come under scrutiny by U.N. officials and civil
rights groups who claim that deportation exposes individuals to the threat
of torture in their respective countries. 87
Critical questions remain about this new announcement. The
Strasbourg Court has reviewed a few cases involving deportation of noncitizens by the Convention's member-states to foreign jurisdictions in
which the deported might be subject to violations ofArticle 3' s prohibition
of torture and inhuman treatment or punishment.88 The leading precedent
is the Court's 1989 judgment in Soering v. United Kingdom. 89 Soering
involved the deportation of a West German national in British custody to
the United States to face trial for capital murder in Virginia after allegedly
killing his girlfriend's parents. 90 Although a formal extradition agreement
existed between the United States and United Kingdom,91 Soering argued
that his extradition to Virginia would amount to a violation of Article 3

83. Id.
84. See UK Govt Outlines Plans to Deport, Bar Islamic Radicals, AFX INT'L FocuS, Aug.
24,2005 (discussing the list of criteria that the U.K. government will use to deport or bar from
entry to Britain Islamic radicals who promote terrorism, published by Home Secretary Charles
Clarke), available at LEXIS, Europe, News, European News Sources File.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. See Gavin Cordon, Clarke angered by UN te"or deportation warning, PRESS ASS'N,
Aug. 24, 2005 (discussing Home Secretary Charles Clarke's reaction to the U.N. warning that
Britain's plan to deport Islamic extremists violates its international human rights obligations),
available at Lexis, World News, Europe, News, European News Sources File.
88. See European Convention for Human Rights, supra note 10, art. 3 ("No one shall be
subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.").
89. Soering v. United Kingdom, App. No. 14038/88.
90. See id. mJ ll-16 (outlining the murders of two people by Soering in Bedford County
Virginia and the U.S. request for extradition by the United Kingdom).
91. See id. ~~ 29-30 (describing the 1972 extradition treaty between the two nations).
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because, if found guilty, he would be subject to the "death row
phenomenon."92 He specifically argued that Article 3 went further than
obliging member-states to prohibit torture or inhuman treatment in their
own jurisdictions, but also served to prevent them from placing a person
in a position where he might be subject to similar treatment in foreign
states. 93 The critical question before the Court was whether or not Soering,
if extradited to Virginia, "faces a real risk of being subjected to torture or
to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment in the requesting
country.,,94 After a review of the circumstances of the specific case,
Virginia's capital murder indictment process and conditions on "death
row," the Court concluded that Soering would be at a real risk of such
treatment if found guilty by Virginia's courts, and unanimously held that
an Article 3 violation would occur if the United Kingdom extradited him
to the United States. 95
It should be noted that the Soering Court recognized the absolute nature
of the Article 3 prohibition of torture and inhuman treatment as a
fundamental human right central to the values of democratic society,
regardless of the circumstances of the alleged behavior leading to a
possible deportation resulting in ill-treatment.96 Article 15 of the
Convention allows no derogation from Article 3 even in times of war or
national emergency.97 As stated by the Court:
ml 80-81.
93. See id.1[82.

92. [d.

The applicant likewise submitted that Article 3 (art. 3) not only prohibits the
Contracting States from causing inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment
to occur within their jurisdiction but also embodies an associated obligation not
to put a person in a position where he will or may suffer such treatment or
punishment at the hands of other States.

Id.
94. Soering, App. No. 14038/88,1[91.
95. See id. 1[ 99 ("The Court's conclusion is therefore that the likelihood of the feared
exposure of the applicant to the 'death row phenomenon' has been shown to be such as to bring
Article 3 (art. 3) into play"); id.1[111 ("Accordingly, the Secretary of State's decision to extradite
the applicant to the United States would, if implemented, give rise to a breach of Article 3.").
Soering was ultimately extradited to Virginia on the guarantee that the death penalty would not be
sought. He is currently serving two life sentences in Virginia. See Jay Conley, Haysom Murders,
20 Years Ago Today: Blood Sweat and Convictions, ROANOKE TIMEs (Va.), Apr. 3, 2005
(discussing the Virginia murders, Soering's imprisonment and aftermath), available at
http://www.roanoke.com/news/roanoke/21202.htrnl.
96. See infra text accompanying note 98.
97. See European Convention for Human Rights, supra note 10, art. 15.
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[t]his absolute prohibition of torture and of inhuman or degrading
treatment or punishment under the terms of the Convention shows
that Article 3 (art. 3) enshrines one ofthe fundamental values ofthe
democratic societies making up the Council of Europe.
. . . It would hardly be compatible with the underlying values ofthe
Convention, that "common heritage of political traditions, ideals,
freedoms and rule of law" to which the Preamble refers, were a
Contracting State knowingly to surrender a fugitive to another State
where there were substantial grounds for believing that he would be
in danger of being subjected to torture, however heinous the crime
allegedly committed. 98

Soering himself was in custody of British authorities at the time of the
Court's proceedings, and did not pose a reasonable safety risk to others.
Even so, these statements suggest that an Article 3 inquiry into the
consequences of possible extradition to another nation focus not on the
nature of the alleged crime committed, but the risk that the deportee will
face after being extradited.
The Court's subsequent 1996 decision in Chahal v. United Kingdom
spoke to circumstances in which the purported deportee posed an active
risk to the host nation. 99 Chahal was an Indian citizen who originally
entered the United Kingdom as an illegal immigrant, but was then residing
in England under an immigration amnesty. 100 Following a 1984 massacre
of Sikh civilians by Indian authorities, Chahal became increasingly
involved in anti-India activities in the United Kingdom, including publicly
advocating for violent separatist acts and alleged attempts to assassinate

1. In time of war or other public emergency threatening the life of the nation
any High Contracting Party may take measures derogating from its obligations
under this Convention to the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the
situation, provided that such measures are not inconsistent with its other
obligations under intemationallaw.
2. No derogation from Article 2, except in respect of deaths resulting from
lawful acts of war, or from Articles 3, 4 (paragraph 1) and 7 shall be made
under this provision.

Id.

98. Soering, App. No. 14038/88, 'IJ 88.
99. Chahal v. United Kingdom, App. No. 15/11/1996.
100. See id. 'IJ'IJ 12-13 (outlining the residency status of the applicant and his family in the
United Kingdom).
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political rivals and Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi. 10I In 1990, the
United Kingdom moved to deport Chahal to India because he was deemed
a threat to national security.102 Chahal argued for political asylum in the
United Kingdom, because if deported to India he would be tortured or
otherwise mistreated, an application denied by the British government. 103
The United Kingdom argued that, unlike the circumstances in Soering,
the applicant in the instant case posed a credible threat to national security,
and that any Article 3 determination as to the possible consequences of
deportation should be limited by the deportee's security threat to the host
nation. I04 The government further argued that a balancing test should be
employed in which the threat to national security should be weighed
against the possible risk of torture in the receiving country. lOS The Court,
however, followed Soering in stating that the Convention's prohibition of
torture was so fundamental to democratic values that no inquiry need be
made into the deportees' activities or possible consequences thereof- the
sole factor to be examined was the degree of real risk of torture of
inhuman treatment that the deportee may face in the receiving country:
Article 3 (art. 3) enshrines one of the most fundamental values of
democratic society.... The Court is well aware of the immense
difficulties faced by States in modem times in protecting their
communities from terrorist violence. However, even in these
circumstances, the Convention prohibits in absolute terms torture

101. See id.1Ml19-24 (describing Chahal's political and alleged criminal activities).
102. See id. ~ 25 ("On 14 August 1990 the Home Secretary (Mr Hurd) decided that Mr Chahal
ought to be deported because his continued presence in the United Kingdom was unconducive to
the public good for reasons ofnational security and other reasons of a political nature, namely the
international fight against terrorism."}.
103. See id. ~~ 26-27 (outlining Chahal's claim for asylum and subsequent denial by the home
secretary).
104. See Chahal, App. No. 15/11/1996, ~ 76 (noting the UK argument that in Article 3
deportation cases like the instant one "various factors should be taken into account, including the
danger posed by the person in question to the security of the host nation").
105. See id.
The greater the risk of ill-treatment, the less weight should be accorded to the
threat to national security. But where there existed a substantial doubt with regard
to the risk of ill-treatment, the threat to national security could weigh heavily in
the balance to be struck between protecting the rights of the individual and the
general interests of the community.

Id.

364

FLORIDA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LA W

[Vol.

17

or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, irrespective of
the victim's conduct.
. . . In these circumstances, the activities of the individual in
question, however undesirable or dangerous, cannot be a material
consideration. 106
Thus, no examination was needed of the potential deportee's activities or
degree of threat to the host nation. After concluding that there was a real
risk that Chahal would face torture or persecution upon expulsion to
India,107 the Court ruled that his deportation would amount to a violation
of Article 3. 108
VI. CONCLUSION

The United Kingdom faces a particular conundrum. It has adapted the
European Convention on Human Rights almost wholesale vis-a-vis the
Human Rights Act. At the same time, it is engaged in an aggressive
military policy overseas and seems poised to embark on a domestic policy
that will push the Convention to its limits. Plaintiffs outside of Europe
such as AI-Skeini may increasingly turn to the Convention for relief so
long as an adequate cross-territorial link can be made. Recently, even
former Iraq President Saddam Hussein has moved to petition the Court in
Strasbourg in regards to his detention and custody in Iraq.109 The European
Convention on Human Rights and its Strasbourg case law will continue to
resonate in the analysis of member-states' actions that are conducted
abroad or which have extraterritorial implications.

106. Id. 1Ml 79-80.
107. See id. 1Ml 87-106 (reviewing contextual evidence regarding practices oftorture in India
and the likelihood that Chahal would be at risk).
108. Id.1I107.
109. See European Court ofHuman Rights Press Release, European Court ofHuman Rights
Rejects Request for Interim Measures by Saddam Hussein, June 30, 2004, available at
http://www.echr.coe.int/EngfPress/2004/JuneIRequestforInterimmeasure-SaddamHussein.htm.

